

The ideal of intellectual autonomy plays an important role in shaping our views on how to conduct inquiry and become responsible knowers. In pursuing their cognitive endeavors, intellectually autonomous agents are supposed to exhibit features such as independence of thought, self-reliance, or self-governance. In the individualistic framework of traditional epistemology, these features have been seen as desiderata of ideal knowers, i.e., of agents who are able to acquire knowledge on their own, by relying on nothing else but their own cognitive capacities and resources. However, as more recent work in social epistemology has shown, most of our beliefs derive from relying on others and their testimony. More generally, our epistemic life is built upon a massive network of social dependencies, which give rise to relations of trust, deference to expert authority, and even paternalistic interferences. This workshop will be devoted to discussing the nature, limitations, consequences and prospects of the ideal of intellectual autonomy.

Organized by the I+D project INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY IN ENVIRONMENTS OF EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE (FFI2017-87395-P) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities



• FEBRUARY 5-6, 2019 •

WORKSHOP ON INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY, EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, AND EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM

{ ORGANIZED BY AEGEA: APPLIED EPISTEMOLOGY RESEARCH GROUP }

FEBRUARY 5: 9:30 - 13:15 (SALÓN DE ACTOS) 14:45 - 18:30 (SALA DE CONFERENCIAS)	FEBRUARY 6: 9:30 - 18:30 (SALA DE CONFERENCIAS)
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WORKSHOP ON INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY, EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM, AND EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY

- Salón de Actos (Tuesday 9:30 - 13:15)
- Sala de Conferencias (Tuesday 14:45 - 18:30; Wednesday 9:30 - 18:30)

Tuesday, 5th of February

9:30 - 10:40	Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff University) - <i>Epistemic feelings and the intellectual vices of hyper-autonomy and heteronomy</i>
10:40 - 10:50	Coffee break
10:50 - 12:00	Marion Vorms (University Paris 1 / IHPST) - <i>Expert advice for decision-making: the moving boundary between informing and instructing</i>
12:05 - 13:15	Xintong Wei (University of St.Andrews & Stirling) - <i>Intellectual autonomy, expert testimony and the a priori</i>
13:15 - 14:45	Lunch
14:45 - 15:55	Shane Ryan (Nazarbayev University) - <i>Autonomy and reflection</i>
15:55 - 16:05	Coffee break
16:05 - 17:15	Javier González de Prado (UNED) - <i>Humble, but not too humble: disagreement as a threat to epistemic autonomy</i>
17:20 - 18:30	Heather Spradley (Harvard University) - <i>Escaping epistemic bubbles: defending an epistemic norm of inquirí</i>

Wednesday, 6th of February

9:30 - 10:40	Emily Sullivan (Delft University of Technology) - <i>Network-first epistemology</i>
10:40 - 10:50	Coffee break
10:50 - 12:00	Jeroen de Ridder (VU Amsterdam) - <i>Algorithm-based illusions of understanding</i>
12:05 - 13:15	Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (Autonomous University of Madrid) - <i>Epistemic care and its duties</i>
13:15 - 14:45	Lunch
14:45 - 15:55	Fleur Jongepier (Radboud University Nijmegen) - <i>Do algorithms know us better than we know ourselves?</i>
15:55 - 16:05	Coffee break
16:05 - 17:15	Josh Habgood-Coote (University of Bristol) - <i>Group inquiry and epistemic objectification</i>
17:20 - 18:30	Jesús Vega-Encabo (Autonomous University of Madrid) - <i>Intellectual autonomy matters</i>

Presentation time: between 35-40 minutes. Q&A: 35-30 minutes